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ON BEHALF OF THE PAGANS AND THE IDOLATERS:
A RESPONSE TO BURRELL
William Hasker

In this comment I express my puzzlement about Burrell's employment of "the
distinction," and request further clarification. I also discuss at some length
his views concerning free will. I explain the libertarian view as I understand
it and point out why his criticisms of it do not succeed. I sketch out his own
view of created freedom, and raise certain questions concerning that view.

David Burell is owed our thanks for his challenging and provocative pa
per. In responding to it, I hope in turn to provoke from him a response
that will further advance the discussion between groups of philosophers
who for convenience I will term "Thomists" and "analytic theists." Many
times, sad to say, it proves impossible to bridge the gulf between contrast
ing philosophical approaches in such a way as to allow for constructive
dialogue, but it is my hope (and, I believe, David's as well) that this case
will prove to be one of the exceptions. I will spend most of this comment
responding to the second part of his paper, in which he discusses free will.
But first I will say a little about the first part, in which the main theme is
God's creation of the world.
We need, according to Burrell, a "radical transformation of standard
philosophical strategies," in order to speak properly about God. Main
stream analytic philosophy of religion has failed to see the need for this
transformation, whereas the sort of Thomism espoused by Burrell does
see the need and has gone a long way towards meeting it. Naturally, we
need to hear more about this transformation. According to Burrell, it is
made possible by attending to the divine creation of the world, and espe
cially to "the distinction" between Creator and creatures. We need to be
clear, then, about the nature of this distinction, and about what needs to
be done in order to observe it properly. A natural place to look is Robert
Sokolowski's book, The God of Faith and Reason,1 which Burrell repeatedly
cites and praises in this and other writings. It was Sokolowski who coined
the term "the Christian distinction" to refer to Christianity's perspective
on God, creation, and the relation between them; Burrell later broadened
this to include Muslim and Jewish theologies, and renamed it simply as
"the distinction."2
It is doubtful, however, that Sokolowski gives us enough to clarify what
Burrell has in mind. Sokolowski points out that Christianity, in opposition
to all forms of paganism, makes the distinction between Creator and the
created world fundamental to its understanding of reality. In elucidating
the distinction, Sokolowski points out that on the Christian view there was
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a very real possibility that all the things in the world, and indeed the world
as a whole, including ourselves, should never have existed. Furthermore,
"we are to think of the possibility of things' not being, and of our own not
being, in such a way that there is no less goodness or greatness—not 'in the
world,' obviously, but 'there' at all."3 "God could and would be God even if
there were no world. . . . To be God, God does not need to be distinguished
from the world, because there does not need to be anything other than
God alone."4 Still further, "God is not himself a competing part of nature
or a part of the world."5 These are excellent and important statements, but
they cannot do the job Burrell needs done, because they do not discrimi
nate among Christian thinkers in the way he wants to do. All of the major
philosophers in the tradition of analytic theism—Alston, Plantinga, Swin
burne, and others—would agree with what Sokolowski has said here. To be
sure, he goes on to elaborate the theme in terms of Thomistic metaphysics,
but we do not receive the impression that he regards this particular meta
physic as essential for a proper grasp of the Christian distinction. (To hold
that this metaphysic is essential would imply a critical attitude towards ear
lier Christian philosophers and theologians that is foreign to his intention.)
In fact, there is little indication in Sokolowski's book of a motivation that is
strong in Burrell, namely the desire to use "the distinction" as a cudgel with
which to belabor other, less adequate, versions of Christian philosophy and
theology. This is perhaps most evident in their very different assessments
of Duns Scotus. For Burrell Scotus, by insisting on a univocal sense of "be
ing" that applies both to creatures and to God, led us far along the road that
ends in our speaking of an idol rather than of God. Sokolowski's very dif
ferent assessment of Scotus is conveyed in the following statement: "There
are figures, like Augustine, the Cappodocians, Aquinas, Scotus, and New
man, who bring out the elementary issues of the faith with such force that
they establish an intellectual age; one can hardly work with the Christian
distinctions and identifications without taking the writings of such men
into consideration, both as examples of the best that can be done and as
expressions of the theological truth that is to be repeated."6
Perhaps, though, the denial of univocal predication, as applying both
to human beings and to the divine, really is the key to "the distinction"
as it is viewed by Burrell. (There is quite a bit in his article that might
lead us to suspect that.) This may strike us as initially unpromising: Is the
kingdom of heaven really founded on a doctrine of analogical predica
tion? Still, grammar should not be sold short, as the Wittgensteinians will
be quick to remind us. But there is a further problem here: the conception
of analogy advocated by Burrell (and, according to him, by Aquinas) is so
informal and apparently common-sensical that it's hard to see how it can
be wielded as a cleaver to sever sound from unsound theology. There is no
formal "theory of analogy" here, but rather the simple acknowledgment
that all sorts of expressions frequently shift their meanings from context
to context. Suppose Alston were convinced by Burrell, and abandoned his
contention that there must be a univocal core underlying analogical predi
cation. (Is it really wise, by the way, to patronize Bill Alston concerning the
philosophy of language?) Would Alston then have to alter substantially
any of his theological beliefs? I doubt that he would, and it doesn't seem
that such a change could possibly have the import Burrell ascribes to "the
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distinction" —an import which, according to him, amounts to nothing less
than the difference between true worship of God and idolatry.
There remains, however, the "dual linguistic rule" formulated by
Kathryn Tanner. Is it here, finally, that we must look for a clear formu
lation of the distinction? The first rule says that divine and non-divine
predicates should be regarded neither as purely univocal nor as simply
equivocal. True enough, but then hardly anyone would disagree (cer
tainly not Alston); not many heretics are going to be caught in a net with
a mesh this large. The second rule is to "avoid in talk about God's creative
agency all suggestions of limitation in scope and manner. The second
rule prescribes talk of God's creative agency as immediate and univer
sally extensive." Here at last we have a formula with some bite to it, but
surely more explanation is required. As it stands, it seems to imply that
God's agency in the case of sinful human actions is exactly the same as
for all other actions and events—but as we shall see, Tanner will have
none of that. It is hard to see, though, how the needed explanations will
not amount to some "limitation in scope and manner" of God's creative
agency. Until the required explanations have been given Tanner's rule can
perhaps function as a slogan to rally around, but certainly not as a precise
definition of "the distinction."
Admittedly I have not in these few pages canvassed everything Burrell
has said that might conceivably be relevant; I have, however, tried to focus
on what seemed the most promising possibilities. So I will close this sec
tion of my comment with an appeal to David Burrell: If "the distinction" is
as important as you say it is, don't you have a moral obligation, as well as
a professional responsibility, to explain to us exactly what it is, and what
must be done in order to observe it properly?
We turn, now, to Burrell's discussion of free will, a discussion which
does not, however, leave the theme of creation behind. On the contrary:
true free will is best described as "created freedom," a conception which
is contrasted with the libertarian view of free will Burrell finds established
among analytic theists, and which he pillories with considerable energy
and enthusiasm. So we need answers to the following questions: What
does Burrell understand the libertarian view to be? Why does he find it
so conspicuously unsatisfactory? What does he offer in its place? I have
to say, however, that I do not find it easy to determine from his paper the
answers to these questions. At times I find myself straining to discern,
through a thick fog of rhetoric, the philosophical points Burrell is trying to
make. I hope, nevertheless, to have found some markers that will serve to
guide us through the fog, but it will not be entirely surprising if at certain
points I have strayed off the path of his thought. At the very least, I hope to
set out clearly what I take him to be saying; if and when I have gone astray,
I trust that my errors will be corrected with at least equal clarity.
What, according to Burrell, is libertarian free will? I believe it will be
helpful if we take as a key his reference to Roderick Chisholm's descrip
tion of the free agent as an "Aristotelian prime mover." Burrell notes that
Chisholm's use of this phrase fails to correspond accurately with Aristot
le's own meaning, but he seems oblivious of the fact that it also seriously
distorts the libertarian conception of free will. The notion is most illumi
nating when it is contrasted with Burrell's notion of the will as responding
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to "the lure of the good." "Human agents," he tells us, "cannot but act for
'the good,' however distortedly they may perceive it. We have no choice
about that; but the very indeterminacy of 'the good,' reflected in inher
ently analogous uses of "good", assures that such an inbuilt orientation
can in no way determine us to a single course of action. Quite the contrary,
that very indeterminacy opens us up to countless possibilities, so provid
ing the ground for rational choice." To which I respond, Bravo! Well said!
We always act for a motive of some kind-som ething that is in some way
desired, and thereby perceived as good, as desirable. But there are a great
many different things, and different kinds of things, that we may perceive
as desirable, even within a single situation. Furthermore (I would add)
in some situations our desires for the different sorts of goods that may
be available to us do not present themselves to us in a fully determinate
"rank order"; rather, it is we ourselves who determine, within the situation,
what it is we most desire. We do have some control, though not unlimited
control, over the relative strengths of our various desires; one way we do
this is by voluntarily directing our attention in this way rather than that.
We reinforce our perseverance in a difficult task by dwelling upon the
goods to be realized by its accomplishment, and we steel ourselves against
temptation by deliberately banishing from our minds the thought of the
pleasure that would result from a course of action we have recognized as
being wrong or otherwise defective. (And of course, we may attempt to do
either of these things, and fail in the attempt; that is an important ingredi
ent in "weakness of will.")7
So far, I take myself to be saying things that are in agreement with Burrell's
account of the will as responding to the lure of the good. (I postpone for
now what he says about evil actions.) I do not believe, furthermore, that
anyone can reasonably take exception to my describing the view I have set
forth as libertarian. Why, then, does Burrell take himself to be expounding
an alternative to libertarian free will? I believe the answer lies in the notion
that is suggested by Chisholm's phrase, "a prime mover, itself unmoved."
Almost incredibly, Burrell seems to think that the libertarian view entails
that a free choice is one that is not moved by the desire for any good at all! This
accounts for his use of the metaphor of "self-goosing," which is indeed
excessively crude but which also thoroughly distorts the libertarian view
it professes to characterize. I can only say that this entire line of criticism
rests on a profound misconception; no one who understands the libertar
ian view can possibly find the criticism anywhere near on target.8
This is not, however, Burrell's only criticism of the libertarian view, and
in fact it is probably not his main objection to the view. His most trenchant
criticism is that the libertarian view removes free creatures from the activity of
the creator, thus in effect "denying the universal scope of creation." This,
he says, is an "essentially Mu'tazalite" view, refereeing to an early school
of Islamic thought that was discredited in consequence of the relentless
determinism embraced by Sunni Islam. (Clearly, one benefit of Burrell's
study of Islamic thought is that it provides him with a whole new battery
of heresies of which he can accuse his theological opponents!) But what
precisely is the force of this charge?
In order to bring this out, I will now characterize more fully the sort
of theistic libertarian view Burrell is criticizing. We suppose, then, that
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someone is making a choice between two alternative courses of action.
(Burrell seems somewhat averse to talking about choice, but I suppose he
will agree that it does occur in human experience!) She is drawn to each of
these alternatives by the lure of some good she envisages as resulting from
it. The agent is a creature of God; she is a small part of a universe which
in its totality was freely created by God ex nihilo. God continually sustains
her in being; without this continual divine action she would instantly col
lapse into nothingness. Furthermore, in sustaining her God sustains her
causal powers, including the power to make choices such as the one that
now lies before her. When she does choose, God adds his "concurrence"
to her decision, enabling it to be carried out.9 Now, will Burrell agree that
this account meets his objection concerning the "universal scope of cre
ation"? If he does agree, I shall be delighted—but also greatly surprised.
My prediction is that he will not agree to this, but why not? The answer
is evident: because the decision as to which act is chosen is made by the human
agent and not by God. This means, however, that the doctrine of creation, as
interpreted by Burrell, entails that human actions are "created by God" in
the sense that God, and God alone, determines which actions shall be performed.
But once we see this clearly, it is evident that the doctrine of creation has
been highjacked, stolen away and given a new meaning that is in no way
implied in the original intention of the doctrine. A doctrine which is, as
Burrell rightly states, the common possession of Christians, Muslims, and
Jews has been appropriated in the interests of a strict theological deter
minism which has never been more than a minority view among Chris
tians and Jews, and is rejected also by many Muslims; all who do not agree
are judged to be pagans! It would be difficult to think of a more blatant
example of theological imperialism!
Burrell is less explicit in setting out his own alternative to the lib
ertarian view; here we must rely mainly on hints and allusions. He
appeals to Kathryn Tanner's description of divine transcendence as "non
contrastive"; this apparently means, in this context, that the claim that
the human agent decides which of two courses to follow is not to be set
in contrast with the claim that it is God who so decides. Yet it is perfectly
clear which of the two "decidings" takes precedence over the other; as
Tanner herself says, "Given God's infallible working, human beings must
choose when and what God wills."10 This is as clear a statement of theo
logical determinism as anyone could wish for, in spite of the fact that both
Tanner and Burrell dislike the word "determinism."11 (Objecting to one's
opponent's choice of terminology can sometimes seem to be a rather trans
parent strategy for avoiding discussion of a topic one dislikes.) The idea is
that since God is creator, and thus on a "different level" from the human
agent, the fact that it is ultimately God who decides what the human being
shall do in no way detracts from her freedom "on the creaturely level."
But what shall be said about actions that are evil and sinful? Here Burrell
has some interesting things to say. "The good," he observes, "draws us on
and empowers our choices by giving them a proper telos." But this means
that "malicious actions are such because they . . . bypass or run counter to
this orientation as we refuse to let ourselves be engaged by it." And this in
turn means that "by running counter to the inbuilt orientation by virtue of
a refusal, evil actions can only be considered less than full-blown actions."
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This needs to be carefully considered. It does not seem to be true, in gen
eral, that a morally wrong action is not lured or "drawn on" by some
envisioned good. In a great many cases, the good that one seeks to attain
through wrong-doing is all too palpable-enjoym ent, economic security,
freedom from fear and anxiety, release of painful psychic ten sio n s-an d is
of a sort that, under different circumstances, it might be entirely right and
appropriate for us to pursue. It is quite true, however, that in performing
a morally wrong action we are neglecting the kind of good that in that
particular situation is most important, the kind that it is incumbent on us,
in that situation, to pursue. And in that sense, such an action is indeed de
fective; it falls short of what an action ought to be. Whether such an action
is thereby also ontologically defective, so that it is "less than a full-blown
action," seems to me dubious, but I will not pursue that point here.
Burrell, however, seeks to exploit this point to sharpen his critique of
libertarianism: "It is primarily malicious actions which display the marks
of 'libertarian freedom,' yet do so by refusing the dynamics of orientation
to the good. So it seems odd to regard freedom so construed as paradig
matic for human free action." This, frankly, is rather strange. Who is it
that regards sinful actions as paradigmatic? No one that I can think of!
Perhaps what Burrell has in mind is that morally wrong and sinful actions
are often cited in showing the need for a libertarian view, because they
bring to the fore both the responsibility of the agent and the importance of
not making God responsible-of not making God the "author of sin." But
of course, morally good actions are equally good examples of actions that
are free in the libertarian sense, as are many actions in which moral right
and wrong are not concerned at all. It is a fault of some presentations of
the libertarian view that they focus exclusively on actions which involve
a choice between moral good and evil, and either imply or state outright
that libertarian freedom manifests itself only in such situations. On the
contrary, there are many other kinds of choices-m any of those involved
in artistic creation, for exam p le-in which there is no question of moral
right and wrong but which nevertheless involve diverse goods between
which the agent must freely decide.
But to return to Burrell's account of malicious actions, what shall be said
about the origination of such actions? At this point I offer an interpretation
that goes beyond what Burrell explicitly says, an interpretation which is,
therefore, very much open to correction by him. His account seems to be
an adaptation of the notion of evil as privatio boni, and is suggestive of
Augustine's remark that sinful actions do not have an efficient cause, but
rather a "deficient cause." This means that we cannot and should not look
for an identifiable cause of sinful actions; this is the "surd of sin," in the
expression borrowed from Lonergan. In this way we avoid ascribing sin to
God as its cause, without having to resort to a libertarian account. A little
dialectical probing, however, reveals the weakness of this defense. Take the
case of a particular sinful action. We ask, if God had willed that the agent
should act virtuously rather than sinfully, and had given her the gracious
assistance enabling her to do so, would she not have acted virtuously? Ev
idently, the answer is Yes, she would. But further: given that God does not
supply such assistance, was it inevitable that she should act sinfully? The
answer, once again, must be Yes, otherwise multiple disasters threaten: it
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would then be the case that it is the agent herself who determines whether
or not she would sin, and it would also be the case that she is able to
act virtuously without the assistance of divine grace—in other words, we
should have not only libertarianism but Pelagianism. But given these two
admissions, to deny that God is the author of sin can be little more than a
semantic evasion. God's causal contribution to a sinful action may not be
the same as to a virtuous action; that much is true enough. But God, by
placing the agent in a situation in which she is required to act virtuously,
and at the same time declining to provide her with the grace that would
enable her to do so, guarantees that she will sin; indeed he necessitates her
sinning. I do not know whether Burrell will accept this conclusion or not;
if not, I shall be most interested to see how he manages to avoid it.
It is interesting to see how Burrell's ally Kathryn Tanner responds to
this difficulty. Given her premises, it would seem that God's creative will
must be directly behind the conjunction of circumstances that leads to a
person's sinning. But this, as she rightly sees, "conflicts with the premise
of God's goodness,"12 and cannot be accepted. And on the other hand,
God's creative will cannot be that she should refrain from sinning, other
wise her actual sin would render that will fallible. In order to avoid both
of these unacceptable consequences, Tanner must hold that God's creative
intention includes neither the intention that the person sin, nor the inten
tion that she refrain from sinning. Rather, God's intention consists of sets
of subjunctive propositions, "propositions, that is, about what else will
happen in the world should the creature sin, and what will happen within
the world should the creature not."13 This has the result of "multiplying,
perhaps indefinitely, the outcomes that may conform to God's will for the
world."14 This does not, however, mean that God's will to save human
beings is subject to failure: "The sinners' intentions are taken up within
the intention of God for the world and are inevitably redirected to the end
God wills, in virtue of the fact that God's will is directly efficacious of ev
erything else in the world besides sin and the fact that God can always will
with the same necessary efficacy that a sinner's heart be transformed."15
This seems to me to be a remarkable combination of some deterministic el
ements with emphases more at home within a libertarian view, all brought
to an optimistic conclusion in a doctrine of universal salvation. While I
am formulating my wish list, I would very much like to know Burrell's
opinion of these views of Tanner's!
In this comment I have expressed my genuine puzzlement about
Burrell's employment of "the distinction," and have discussed at some
length his views concerning free will. I have explained the libertarian
view as I understand it and have pointed out why his criticisms of it do
not succeed. I have also sketched out, as best I could, his own view of cre
ated freedom, and have raised certain questions concerning that view. It is
my hope that in his response he will clarify further his own view, where
that is needed, and will bring to a focus his objections to the ideas that are
typical of the analytic mainstream in philosophy of religion. We pagans
and idolaters, it seems to me, are owed that much!
Huntington University
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1. The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982).
2. I find myself wondering whether Burrell can afford to be as comfort
able as he seems to be with the Islamic notion of shirk, the heresy of “asso
ciating the creature with God." Isn't that notion formulated, at least in part,
precisely in order to condemn the worship of Jesus by Christians? As stated
on a poster carried in a demonstration: “Jesus was a Muslim prophet, not the
Son of God."
3. Sokolowski, op. cit., p. 32.
4. Ibid., p. 33.
5. Ibid., p. 36.
6. Ibid., p. 28.
7. Further discussion of this aspect of libertarian free will may be found
in chapter 11 of my Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (London: Routledge, 2004), and in chapter 6 of The Triumph of God Over Evil (Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008).
8. I do not believe that Chisholm himself understands the phrase in the
way I am objecting to. His meaning can perhaps best be captured by adding
a gloss: “prime mover, itself unmoved by any sufficient cause." (See his discus
sion of motives that “incline but do not necessitate" in Person and Object: A
Metaphysical Study (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 69.))
9. Actually the need for a distinct divine act of concurrence is contro
versial; I include it here in order to present Burrell with the richest possible
theistic account of libertarian choice.
10. Kathryn Tanner, “Human Sin, Human Freedom, and God the Creator,"
in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F.
Tracy (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994),
pp. 111-35; quotation from p. 127.
11. Following Richard Taylor, I take determinism to be “the general philo
sophical thesis which states that for everything that ever happens there are
conditions such that, given them, nothing else could happen" (“Determin
ism," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 359). Theological determinism
is determinism in which the relevant conditions have to do with the will and
decrees of God.
12. Tanner, p. 132.
13. Ibid., p. 133. Tanner actually calls these “pseudosubjunctive" proposi
tions, but this is an unnecessary refinement; the propositions are subjunctives
pure and simple.
14. Ibid., p. 134.
15. Ibid., p. 135. For my own comments on Tanner's views, see my “God
the Creator of Good and Evil?" in The God Who Acts, pp. 137-46.

